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Abstract
This paper investigates why consumers choose calling plans that are not always
cost-minimizing. Our approach is twofold: we account for general difficulties
facing a tariff choice, as well as for biased preferences. We provide evidence from
an experiment among German university students and staff, finding that partic-
ipants are often not aware of their actual consumption. In line with the findings
on flat-rate biases, respondents systematically overestimate their consumption.
On the other hand, they are generally able and willing to detect optimal tar-
iffs. Furthermore, with increasing usage level, consumers’ performance improves.
However, some participants hold strong preferences for certain tariff forms, seduc-
ing them to choose cost-dominated offers. In our setup, we find that respondents
prefer tariffs involving subsidies or hire-purchase options for handsets over con-
tracts with buy now options.
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Mobile phone tariffs, Handset subsidy, Hire-
purchase of device
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1 Introduction
The mobile telecommunications market in Germany is characterized by fierce competi-
tion among the four network operators T-Mobile, Vodafone, E-Plus and o2. Although
the German market is nearly saturated, the penetration rates are still increasing. Statis-
tically every German possesses 1.3 mobile contracts today. This development is mainly
driven by continuous price cuts, particularly by discount offers (Bundesnetzagentur
2009, p. 50ff). Hence, the average revenues per subscriber (ARPU) are decreasing.
Figure 1 shows that the average monthly ARPU has declined by approximately 40%
between 2003 and 2010.














Source: Merrill Lynch (2010)
New tariff structures become necessary for the network operators to stay profitable.
One of these innovations is the abolition of handset subsidies, which are very costly
for the operators (Kruse, Haucap and Dewenter 2004). Especially, smaller providers
face high costs due to lower capacity utilization, caused by fewer subscribers and voice
volumes. Therefore, E-Plus and o2 started to sell tariffs which do not include the corre-
sponding mobile device. Deferred payments with low, or even no, interest payments are
also offered. The following table 11 summarizes the different tariff structures offered for
a similar mobile device, here the iPhone. Mobile phone tariffs generally comprise and
vary in prices for monthly subscription, usage and handsets. The first-movers T-Mobile
and Vodafone who still account for 65% of the market share (Bundesnetzagentur 2009),
continue to subsidize mobile devices, whereas the smaller operator o2 sells the same
1Vodafone’s tariff SuperFlat Internet Allnet differs in some minor points from T-Mobile’s tariff
Complete Mobile XL. The data flat rate is limited after 2 GB, the SMS flat rate is unlimited (more
than 3000 SMS) and 1500 MMS are included. The o2 o tariff is a a pay-per-use contract with a cost
cap at 50 EURO, meaning the customers bill is limited to 50 EURO, the Internet L Package costs 15
EURO per month
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handset without discounts. Using the assumptions of the OECD high-usage basket
(OECD 2009), we find that o2 tariffs generate lower costs for the OECD high user,
given a 24 month contract duration and no interest rates2.
Table 1: Example for the Apple iPhone 4 (16 GB), prices are given in Euro
Operator T-Mobile and Vodafone o2
Tariff Complete M. L Complete M. XL o2 Blue o2 o
SuperFlat I. SuperFlat I. Allnet 100/250 + Int. L
Voice
subscription fee 59.95e 99.95e 20/35e [15,65]e
incl. minutes national 120 (also EU) 120 100/250
to fixed networks free free 0.29e 0.15e
on-net free free free 0.15e
off-net 0.29e free 0.29e 0.15e
SMS
incl. SMS national 40 3000 free 0.15e
incl. SMS on-net free free 0.15e
further SMS national 0.19e 0.19e free 0.15e
Mobile device
iPhone 4 (16 GB) 99.95e 1.00e 649e or
49e + 25e/month
Source: T-Mobile (2010), Vodafone (2010) and o2 (2010)
Based on marketing science and behavioral economics, we know that many con-
sumers in mobile telecommunications choose calling plans that are not always cost
minimizing (e.g. Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Bolle and Heimel 2005). In our paper,
we examine how consumers decide between mobile phone tariffs with different contract
components. Therefore, we run an experiment with 87 members of the Heinrich-Heine
University and test for preferences in selecting mobile phone contracts. Abstracting
from demand uncertainty and preferences regarding service quality, images of opera-
tors and network externalities, our focus lies on the choice between contracts with and
without handset subsidies.
Our paper is organized as follows: The next section 2 provides an overview of
the theoretical background and we derive five testable hypothesis. Section 3 explains
our experimental design and procedure. Chapter 4 summarizes our descriptive and
empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes and provides policy implications.
2See Appendix.
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2 Literature and Hypothesis
According to traditional economic theory, consumers are assumed to be rational utility
maximizers. However, various articles in the field of behavioral economics show that
consumers take irrational decisions, violating the expected utility hypothesis. The
theory of bounded rationality, such as in the versions of Simon (1957), Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and Gigerenzer and Selten (2002), incorporates psychological research
into economic theory. It introduces several important concepts in the environment
of choices under risk, e.g. loss aversion and the shape of the probability weighting
function.
In a telecommunication setup, certain aspects of irrational behavior are of interest.
In order to detect the right calling plan and maximize the expected utility, consumers
have to be aware of their actual and future consumption. Several authors, like Mitchell
and Vogelsang (1991), Taylor (1994) and Nunes (2000), state that consumers are not
aware of their actual consumption and quite inaccurate in predicting their future usage.
Based on these findings, we derive hypothesis H1 as potential reason for irrational tariff
choices:
H1: Consumers are incapable of estimating their actual average consumption cor-
rectly.
Facing a tariff decision, consumers are confronted with a considerable number of alter-
natives, comprising many different parameters. In our setup, the number of relevant
parameters is reduced to three. Nevertheless, participants could still face difficulties
due to lacking mathematical abilities. Even if consumers have the ability to analyti-
cally derive the optimal tariff, they might still not be willing to do so. Morwitz et al.
(1998) and Hossain and Morgan (2006) test whether consumers account for total costs,
including e.g. costs for shipping and handling, or just stick to the base price. They
find that consumers are often not motivated to perform these calculations properly and
hence make wrong decisions. In our setup, this implies that participants possibly do
not account for all parameters. Both arguments are summarized in H2:
H2: Consumers are unable and/or unwilling to perform the calculations needed to
find the cost-minimizing tariff.
Additionally, consumers may find it hard to cope with telecommunication specific as-
pects, respectively a mobile phone bill. Especially, not all mobile phone subscribers
are familiar with the interpretation of billing increments. This ability is tested by H3:
H3: Consumers face difficulties analyzing a mobile phone bill.
Selecting tariffs, consumers’ usage level plays a decisive role for their performance. If
consumption is low, the cost differences between optimal and non-optimal tariffs are
relatively small. According to Clay et al. (1992) and Srinagesh (1992), especially these
minor cost differences induce a careless behavior of the consumers. This is also proved
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by Miravete (2003) who finds that households with lower consumption perform worse
than those with higher usage. With H4, we verify if these results are also true in our
experimental setup.
H4: Low volume users are more likely to opt for cost-dominated tariffs than high
volume users.
In addition to these more general causes for irrational choices, our paper investigates
consumers’ preferences for different payment forms including deferred payments. So far,
various articles have been published, dealing with irrational behavior in the telecom-
munication context. One strand of literature covers consumers’ choice between flat
rate tariffs and pay-per-use tariffs. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006), Gerpott (2009) and
Mitomo et al. (2009) detect in their experiments a sustainable flat-rate bias, leading to
consumers choosing flat rate tariffs even though pay-per-use tariffs would yield lower
invoices. Bolle and Heimel (2005) and Haucap and Heimeshoff (2011) check for irra-
tional decisions in the context of on-net and off-net calls and Krämer and Wiewiorra
(2010) do research on mobile phone tariffs with cost caps. In line with these papers,
we assume consumers to hold preferences in favor of different payment forms. These
considerations are crucial in our model in which total costs are the only decision param-
eter. Hence, any deviation from the calling plan with the lowest overall expenditures
can be classified as irrational choice, leading to H5:
H5: Strong preferences for handset subsidies deter consumers from selecting the tariff
with the lowest total costs.
Although various aspects of mobile tariffs have already been studied, as far as we
know tariff choice in the context of subsidies has not been analyzed. The next section
explains our experimental design and procedure.
3 Empirical Specification
3.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment3 is structured in three distinctive parts. In the first part, respondents
are asked to estimate their average monthly consumption in terms of outgoing minutes.
This estimation is compared to the average usage of their last three mobile phone bills.
If the participants estimate their consumption correctly, meaning within a range of
±20%, they receive an extra payment of 1000 taler.4
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 tariff choices. Participants are
randomly assigned to the groups A, B, C and D, which are almost equally large. They
are incentivized to take cost-minimizing decisions as they are equipped with a certain
3See Appendix for further information.
41000 taler =̂ 1 Euro.
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amount of money,5 which is consequently reduced by the costs for the tariffs they
choose.
To control for different billing formats6, the 10 choices are subdivided into two
rounds of five choices each. In round 1, participants are told to assume a particular
average of monthly outgoing minutes (either 25 min., or 70 min., or 120 min., or 200
min.)7 and take it as given throughout the next five decisions (choices 1 to 5). The
second five questions (choices 6 to 10) are composed in the same way as the first
five questions. But in the second round participants have to calculate their average
monthly outgoing minutes themselves. A fictional mobile phone bill is handed out and
participants are told to take it as representative for their monthly consumption during
the choices 6 to 10. The fictional bills are arranged to again display either a 25 min., 70
min., 120 min., or 200 min. monthly usage. Those participants who base their choices
on 25 min. in the first round, are confronted with a mobile phone bill of 120 min. in
the second round and vice versa. Those who start with a 70 min. (200 min.) usage in
round 1, receive a 200 min. (70 min.) bill in the second choice scenario, respectively.
Figure 2 illustrates the design of our experiment.
Figure 2: Design of the Experiment
Group
Choices
Round 1 Round 2
A 25 min. 120 min. 
B 70 min. 200 min.
C 120 min. 25 min.
D 200 min. 70 min.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Based on the usage, participants are asked to select their optimal tariff out of three
given tariffs (T1, T2 and T3). All three tariffs include an identical mobile device
and run for 24 months. Each tariff comprises a price for the handset, a monthly
subscription fee and a charge per minute for outgoing calls, irrespective of calling on-
net or off-net (i.e. fixed line and other mobile networks). All 10 choices are of the
following representative form:
Decision: As your former mobile phone contract has run out of contract, you have
the chance to choose between the following mobile phone tariffs:
5Group A & C receive 19000 taler and group B & D receive 24000 taler, respectively. The endow-
ments differ to ensure that, irrespective of the group, participants may achieve identical earings.
6Usually, mobile operators only list the outgoing calls and minutes in the mobile bill, but some
also provide the total amount of outgoing minutes.
7By the end of 2009, the with market shares weighted average of outgoing mobile minutes per
subscriber was 124 minutes/month in Germany (Merrill Lynch 2010). Therefore, our four groups
represent realistic cases for low, medium and high mobile usage.
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T1: Price for the mobile phone = 0 taler, monthly subscription fee = 10 taler, price
per minute for outgoing calls = 0.6 taler.
T2: Price for the mobile phone = 120 taler, monthly subscription fee = 10 taler, price
per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 taler.
T3: Price for the mobile phone = 0 taler, monthly subscription fee = 15 taler, price
per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 taler.
The setup of our experiment is explained in the following table 2. Part 2 explains
the composition of the 5 different questions (choice 1-5 and 6-10, respectively). The first
two decisions of each round test participants’ logical understanding of the experiment
and intend to familiarize them with our experimental design. The other three scenarios
control for respondents’ tariff preferences regarding different handset payment options.
Table 2: Experimental Setup
Part 1 Estimation of average monthly consumption
Part 2 Tariff choices
Choice 1(6) & Choice 2(7) Choice 3(8)
T1 Logical understanding & Handset subsidy
T2 familiarization with Buy now option
T3 experimental design Hire-purchase option (no mark-up)
Choice 4 (9) Choice 5(10)
T1 Handset subsidy Handset subsidy
T2 Hire-purchase option (no mark-up) Hire-purchase option (with mark-up)
T3 Buy now option Buy now option
Part 3 Questionnaire on personal characteristics
In the third part, participants are asked to give detailed information on personal
characteristics (age, gender, course of studies etc.) and their calling behavior (prepaid
contract, provider changes etc.). The final question tests which tariff they have chosen
if they were indifferent between two or three options (being listed first, lowest monthly
subscription fee etc.). The following subsection explains our experimental procedure.
3.2 Experimental Procedure
We invited a total of 87 students and staff members of the Heinrich-Heine-University
Duesseldorf via Orsee to our experiment. Participants were ask to bring their last three
mobile phone bills for which they received three Euro extra. 27 of the 87 participants
brought the requested bills along. However, 31 respondents were prepaid customers
and thus do not receive monthly bills at all.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 87 25.59 7.94 18 56
semester 81 4.65 4.18 1 23
female 87 0.52 0.5 0 1
estimated consumption 87 264.76 519.35 3 3000
real consumption 27 150.86 198.94 3 701
prepaid 87 0.36 0.48 0 1
switched 87 0.36 0.48 0 1
econ 87 0.18 0.39 0 1
groupAC 87 0.47 0.50 0 1
Network Operator
T-Mobile 87 0.14 0.35 0 1
Vodafone 87 0.2 0.4 0 1
E-plus 87 0.38 0.49 0 1
o2 87 0.29 0.46 0 1
Mobile Internet Usage
never 87 0.68 0.47 0 1
rarely 87 0.06 0.23 0 1
sometimes 87 0.09 0.29 0 1
regularly 87 0.17 0.38 0 1
Satisfaction with provider
very pleased 87 0.21 0.41 0 1
pleased 87 0.57 0.50 0 1
less pleased 87 0.15 0.36 0 1
discontent 87 0.05 0.21 0 1
The descriptive statistics are summarized in table 3. All respondents (52% female)
use mobile telephony, with an average age of 25.6 years. The market shares of the
providers E-Plus (38%), o2 (29%), Vodafone (20%) and T-Mobile (14%) differ from
the real market situation in Germany, where T-Mobile and Vodafone hold 36.3% and
32.1% of the market share, respectively. In addition, E-Plus and o2 serve 17.3% and
14.2% of all customers (Bundesnetzagentur, 2009). The differences in the operators’
market shares can be explained by the fact that the participants were mostly students
who are more likely E-net8 customers due to lower price offers. 78% of the participants
are very satisfied or satisfied with their provider, but 36% of our respondents have
switched their provider within the last two years. This churn rate is compared to the
findings of a study on consumers’ switching behavior (EU Commission 2009) relatively
8E-Plus and o2 operate in the frequency range of 1800 MHz (E-net), whereas T-Mobile and Voda-
fone use the frequency range of 900 MHz (D-net).
7
high. Our descriptive and empirical results are discussed in the next section 4.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Results
First, we investigate the degree to which the participants in our sample know their av-
erage monthly consumption in terms of outgoing minutes. In line with H1, we find that
about 81.5% of the participants do not estimate their actual usage correctly. Approx-
imately 60% of them have overestimated their average use. Another interesting fact is
that the average prediction error is 320 min. for the respondents who overestimated
and only 170 min. for the participants who unterestimated their real consumption.
This indicates that the prediction bias is almost twice as large in the overconfident
group. Hence, it is likely that consumers do not choose cost-minimizing tariffs, leading
to systematic errors. These findings are in line with the growing literature related to
flat-rate biases (e.g. Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Gerpott 2009).
Finding the cost-minimizing mobile phone tariff involves some sort of calculations.
Based on the questions testing their ability/willingness to perform the calculations cor-
rectly, H2 has to be rejected. In our data set only two out of 87 participants repeatedly
select cost dominated tariffs in questions targeting the logical understanding of the
experiment (choice 1, 2, 6 and 7). Additionally, from our final question regarding in-
differences between different payment forms, we infer that just 2.3% of the respondents
choose tariffs because they are listed first. We conclude that non-optimal choices are
not caused by lacking understanding/motivation but by biased preferences. However,
we offer the participants very stylized forms of mobile phone tariffs, containing only
three variables. In reality, consumers are confronted with a lot more criteria including
e.g. different prices for on-net and off-net calls and prices for text messages. Therefore,
the increasing complexity might however support H2.
H3 suggests that participants face difficulties analyzing a mobile phone bill. In
order to test H3, we compare the answers given in the first round for a specific usage
(25, 70, 120 or 200 min.) to the choices in the second round. The two rounds just differ
in the format the average monthly consumption is presented. In the first round it is
given, in the second round participants have to perform calculations themselves. By
applying a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test9 for all corresponding questions and
groups, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, stating that the distributions are equal.
We conclude that there are no differences in the distributions between the first and
9A two-sample K-S test tests for the equality of distributions between two groups. The distribution
of each choice for group A (B) is compared with that of the group C (D), respectively. For example,
we first merge the results of question 3 for group A with the results of question 8 of group C both
including a usage of 25 min./month. Subsequently, we determine if there are any differences in the
distribution between group A and C (for further information see Büning and Trenkler 1994). All K-S
tests are summarized in Table 9 in the Appendix.
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the second round for any usage type. Hence, H3 has to be rejected, indicating that
respondents are able to interpret a representative monthly bill.
Based on the results stated above, we match all groups with the same average
of monthly consumption, irrespective of the two rounds. For example, the results of
questions 1 to 5 of group A are combined with the answers to questions 6 to 10 of
group C. This process reduces the number of choices to five, labeled 1∗ − 5∗. Figure 3
illustrates the reduced setup.
Figure 3: Reduced Setup
Choices
Group 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
A + C 25 min. 
B + D 70 min.
C + A 120 min.
D + B 200 min.
H4 assumes differences in the performance between low and high volume users. The
main explanation is that higher consumption increases the cost differences between
optimal and non-optimal tariffs. Hence, high volume users have in general stronger
incentives to subscribe to the cost-optimal tariff. In our experiment, every respondent
makes on average 0.95 mistakes answering the 10 questions. The participants of group
A and C give wrong answers in 10.5% of all questions, whereas the respondents of
group B and D fail in 8.7% of all choices. These first results support H4, as the total
usage of group A and C is lower than for group B and D. For an in depth investigation,
we compare the average error for the lowest and the highest assumed usage based on
the reduced setup. For 25 min., the average error rate is 5.9% compared to 4.3% for
a 200 min. usage. Despite of higher error rates, lowest volume users spend on average
just 67.3 taler too much compared to 117.9 taler for maximum volume users. We
conclude that in line with H4, high users are disciplined and more likely to opt for the
cost-minimizing tariff.
As already mentioned above, mobile phone tariffs in our experiment constitute of
and vary in the following cost components: monthly subscription fees, usage-dependent
prices and handset payments. H5 states that consumers have strong preferences for
specific mobile phone tariffs. In general, three different tariff concepts can be dis-
tinguished. Consumers can choose between tariffs including a buy now option, a
hire-purchase alternative or a handset subsidy. Consumers may either purchase the
handset immediately at contract formation (buy now option) or pay the handset price
by monthly installments (hire-purchase option). For these two varieties all other tariff
components are identical, except for the monthly fixed costs. Contracts with handset
9
subsidies contain no or low expenditures for the handset, as they are included in the
relatively higher cost of usage. Preferences for some tariff forms are tested by question
3∗, 4∗ and 5∗.
First, we look at choice 3∗ with the possible choices: tariff with a handset subsidy
(T1), a buy now option (T2) and a hire-purchase option with zero interest rate (T3).
In case of 25 min. or 200 min. average monthly usage, the tariffs T2 and T3 both
minimize costs. Thus, we would expect the two options to be chosen equally often.
For 70 min. or 120 min. consumption, the tariffs T1, T2 and T3 yield equal payments
and an evenly distribution between the three tariff forms would be likely. Based on
identical rational options the results for 25 min. and 200 min., and 70 min. and 120
min. are grouped and compared to the expected, cost-minimizing tariff choices.









T 1 T 2 T 3
Combined results for 25 and 200 min.









T 1 T 2 T 3
Combined results for 70 and 120 min.
Choice 3* Expected choice
The left side of figure 4, showing the results for the 25 min. and 200 min. usage,
highlights two different aspects. Comparing the two cost-minimizing choices, rational
participants seem to prefer the hire-purchase option (T3) over the buy now option
(T2). In our experiment, they possess enough money to select both alternatives, how-
ever respondents might have in mind their real financial background, leading to the
preferences for the hire-purchase option. The second insight is that even though the
alternative T1 (handset subsidy) is dominated, it is chosen by about 10%. This in-
dicates a quite strong bias of some participants towards the cost-dominated tariff T1
including a handset subsidy. Looking at the usage types separately, we find that 15%
in the 25 min. and only 6.5% in the 200 min. usage group select the more expensive
T1. This again supports somehow H4.
The preference for subsidies is also confirmed by the results presented on the right
side of figure 4. Although all three tariffs are rational in this setup, the distribution of
the given answers differs from the expected one. It is shifted in favor of the handset
subsidy tariff.
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Applying chi-square goodness of fit tests10, we find that the observed choices are
significantly different (p-value = 0.0007) from the expected ones for the 25 min. and
200 min. usage. In contrast, for 70 min. and 120 min., the null hypothesis that each
option is chosen equally often can not be rejected (p-value = 0.2605).
Question 4∗ is constructed similarly to question 3∗, but on a higher cost level. We
find identical choice patterns. But with increasing tariff cost, even more participants
tend to prefer the option with a handset subsidy, yielding lower down payments.
In question 5∗ we have introduced higher costs for the hire-purchase option in
comparison to the buy now option. Additionally, we have rearranged the tariff choices
to avoid habituation effects. Participants can choose between a tariff with a handset
subsidy (T1), a hire-purchase option with a positive mark-up (T2) and a buy now
option (T3). The buy now option dominates in all usage groups. Figure 5 illustrates our
results. We find that in all possible usage combinations about 30% of the participants
prefer the hire-purchase option over the direct purchase, even if they incur a 1% loss
due to higher costs. Applying once more chi-square goodness of fit tests for all usage
combinations, we find that in all cases the observed choices are significantly different
from the expected ones, all on a 5% significance level or higher.







T 1 T 2 T 3
Combined results for 25 and 70 min. 







T 1 T 2 T 3
Combined results for 25 and 200 min.







T 1 T 2 T 3
Combined results for 70 and 120 min.







T 1 T 2 T 3
Combined results for 120 and 200 min. 
Choice 5* Expected Choice
Compared to the results of question 3∗ for 25 min. and 200 min. usage, the handset
10A chi-square goodness of fit test tests whether observed percentages for a categorical variable are
significantly different from expected percentages. For further information see Büning and Trenkler
1994.
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subsidy option is no longer chosen. Being in group 25 min. (200 min.) and selecting
the handset subsidy tariff causes additional costs of 60 taler (840 taler) in question 3∗
and 360 taler (1200 taler) in question 5∗. Consequently, consumers hold preferences
for the handset subsidy option (T1), but do not realize them if they are too costly.
The same holds true for the preferences for the hire-purchase option over the direct
purchase. But relatively low cost differences and thus occurred losses in question 5∗ do
not prevent them from choosing this option. Summing it up: Consumers are biased in
favor of the handset subsidy and the hire-purchase option but only up to an individual
limit. If costs for the preferred variety exceed this certain threshold, consumers select
the cost-minimizing tariff.
If we look separately at the different usage types, we find again that low user are
more likely to choose non-minimizing tariffs due to smaller costs differences than high
users. These results show again evidence in favor of H4.
In the next section 4.2, we empirically analyze the tariff selection in more detail. We
want to investigate which characteristics influence the likelihood of rational behavior
by applying probit and logit regressions.
4.2 Estimation Results
In this subsection, we focus on questions 3∗ and 5∗. From question 3∗ we aim to
empirically explore which factors drive the probability of choosing the the hire-purchase
option over the direct purchase if the two options are equally expensive. With question
5∗ we investigate which factors influence the probability of choosing the cost-minimizing
buy now option.
First, we look at choice 3∗ in more detail. As explained above, we can only compare
the variants 25 min. and 200 min. and variants 70 min. and 120 min. due to differing
optimal answers. For 25 min. and 200 min., T2 and T3 are optimal. As presented in
figure 4, the hire-purchase option (T3) seems to be preferred over the direct purchase
of the handset (T2). Therefore, we wish to determine which characteristics influence
the likelihood of selecting the hire-purchase option, taking only the rational consumers
into considerations. Our explanatory variables contain information on age and the time
needed to take a decision. In addition, we include dummies to control for personal char-
acteristics. We distinguish whether a person is female (female), a prepaid customer
(prepaid), an economics student (econ), a frequent mobile Internet user (mobinthigh),
a E-net customer (enet), satisfied with her net provider (satisfiedhigh), and if she has
switched the provider within the last two years (switched). Furthermore, we include a
group dummy equal to 1 if a respondent is in group A or C. Here, groupAC indicates
a 25 min. usage. Our results are presented in table 411.
As we drop all irrational choices, our observations reduce to 76. Focusing on the
probit regression, we find that our discrete variables female and econ both have a
11A detailed description of all relevant variables can be found in Table 6 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: Choice 3∗ for 25 min. and 200 min.
Variable Probit Logit






















Pseudo R2 0.1357 0.1354
∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistically significant on the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level
Results are already transformed to marginal effects
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
significant and positive influence on the likelihood of choosing the hire-purchase op-
tion. Furthermore, groupAC has a significant, but negative effect. As we have reported
marginal effects in table 3 for the probit regression, we can directly interpret these
effects: The probability of selecting the hire-purchase option is 0.1969 higher if a sub-
ject is female. Additionally, the probability of choosing T3 increases by 0.1978, if the
person studies economics or business administration. Although there is no monetary
difference between the two tariffs in our experiment, this might be explained by the
discounting theory learned during the first semesters. For those participants who as-
sume a 25 min. usage, the likelihood of selecting the hire-purchase option is reduced
by 0.2259. Our results are robust applying logit regression. Around 13.5% of the total
variation is explained by our model. A drawback is that all three variables are only
13
significant on a 10% significance level.
Analyzing choice 3∗ for the variants 70 min. and 120 min., we do not find any
significant effects indicating which variables determine the preferences for a specific
tariff option. This is not very surprising, as we already see in figure 4 that the variation
between the three tariff options is low due to identical costs.
In addition, we examine choice 5*, where we have included a make-up of about 1%
for the hire-purchase option over the direct purchase. In this setup, it is rational to
choose the buy now option for all given usage types. Table 5 summarizes our empirical
results for the representative 25 min. and 200 min. usage.12
Table 5: Choice 5∗ for 25 min. and 200 min.
Variable Probit Logit






















Pseudo R2 0.2840 0.2779
∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistically significant on the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level
Results are already transformed to marginal effects
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
12The probit estimations for all other possible usage combinations can be found in Table 7 in the
Appendix.
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Regarding the probit regression, the variables age and enet both have a negative,
but highly significant effect on the likelihood of choosing the direct purchase option.
While time and satisfiedhigh both have a positive influence on a 5% significance level
or higher. The probability of selecting the direct purchase option decreases by 0.0239
per year of age. Being an E-net customer reduces the likelihood of choosing T3 by
0.2377. The reason might be that price-sensitive E-net customers are deterred by the
high direct payment of T3. Those participants who take more time to make a decision
are more likely to opt for the rational tariff, although the magnitude is with 0.0039
rather small. Being satisfied with their mobile operator increases the probability of
selecting T3 by 0.3498. Moreover, 28.4% of the total variation is explained by our
model.
All aspects considered, the findings suggest that some individual factors shape
mobile phone tariff choice. In the final section, we summarize our results and discuss
resulting policy implications.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Our paper has analyzed different sources for potential biases in consumers’ mobile
tariff choices. We detect that consumers are often not aware of their average monthly
consumption in terms of outgoing minutes. Recent developments have compounded this
problem. According to § 99 of the German Telecommunications Act (TKG), network
operators are allowed, but not obliged, to list all outgoing calls covered by a voice flat
rate. Recently, some network operators do no longer publish all calls placed within a
flat rate. Thus, consumers may be unable to verify their individual consumption on
the basis of their mobile phone bill. Contrary to the argumentation of the network
operators and the Federal Network Agency, we believe that the existing regulation
harms consumers, making it even more difficult for them to find out their monthly
consumption.
Being confronted with mobile phone tariffs, consumers are able to interpret different
components. In principle, they know how to find cost-minimizing tariffs. This is
also true if the consumption is based on stylized mobile phone bills. However, in
reality mobile phone tariffs are often presented in a rather different way than in our
experiment. Consumers have to extract all relevant information from the Internet or
from brochures for innumerably many tariffs. Additionally, the number of relevant
parameters is typically not limited to three. This makes is a lot more difficult for the
consumers to come up with the optimal tariff.
In our setup, we find that high users perform better than respondents with lower
consumption levels. Due to larger cost differences between optimal and non-optimal
tariffs, high users are disciplined and more likely to opt for the cost-minimizing tariff.
Besides, consumers seem to have preferences for certain tariff forms, possibly de-
terring them from selecting cost-minimizing tariffs. We have shown that consumers
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hold preferences for subsidies and hire-purchases of mobile devices. In one of our se-
tups, about 10% select the cost-dominated handset subsidy, indicating a stong bias.
And among the two rational payment options for the handset (direct purchase and the
hire-purchase), participants clearly prefer the second possibility.
These findings are also confirmed in a second setup, where around 28% of the
participants opt for the more expensive hire-purchase tariff. We infer that the likelihood
of choosing the cost-minimizing direct purchase increases if participants are satisfied
customers and with the time taken for making a decision. In addition, we find that
the probability decreases with age and if a participant is an E-net customer.
Our insights are also of special interest for the mobile operators, as they can easily
profit from consumers preferences. In fact, operators seem to exploit existing biases.
For example, T-Mobile and Vodafone continue to subsidize mobile devices, whereas o2
offers the direct purchase or the hire-purchase of the iPhone. Within o2 tariffs, the
hire-purchase option includes no interest payments compared to the direct purchase.
However, it is also possible to buy the iPhone directly via the Apple store where it is up
to 8% less expensive compared to the o2 offers. This induces that o2 introduces hidden
interest rates for the hire-purchase option. Still, consumers could prefer purchasing
via the operators. Transaction costs might be one explanation, biased preferences for
hire-purchases as we found it in our experiment another.
We have merely presented a first step into the investigation of consumers’ prefer-
ences for different handset payment forms. While our study has focused on certain
special reasons for irrational tariff choices, there may be many more aspects left to
analyze. Especially, the flat-rate bias has to be mentioned and kept in mind for a com-
plete analysis. Further work should especially consider potential bias from increasing
tariff complexity and the effects of network externalities.
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We use the assumptions (table 6) of the OECD high usage type (OECD 2009) to
calculate average costs of the different tariffs presented in table 1 given a 24 month
contract duration.13 Assuming away interest rates, the present value of the two year
contracts Complete Mobile XL (T-Mobile) or SuperFlat Internet Allnet(Vodafone) is
2399.80 Euro, whereas the o2 tariff o2 o plus Internet L costs only 2092.60 Euro over
the period of 24 month.
Table 6: OECD High User Type, Usage per year and its distribution
Distribution
Components Fixed Mobile on-net Mobile off-net Voicemail
246 outgoing call minutes 20% 47% 26% 7%
55 SMS 65% 35%
1 MMS
Source: OECD (2009)
Information on the experiment14
Welcome to this decision experiment regarding mobile phone tariffs.
Please read the instructions carefully. The entire experiment is anonymous. Through-
out the experiment you - as a participant - take the role of a consumer with a given
consumption, choosing between different fictitious mobile phone tariffs. In the first
round, you will be given a precise number of minutes which you use per month. This
value is crucial for the choice of tariff. In the second round, you have to calculate your
monthly consumption based upon a fictitious representative invoice in order to find the
optimal tariff. All mobile phone contracts include the following terms:
1. A contract period of 24 months.
2. No cancellation ahead of contract termination.
3. Billing increment 60/60 (i.e. every inchoate minutes is counted completely).
Ten decisions are to be made in this experiment in total. Interest rates are not taken
into account in this experiment. As supporting tools you may use a pencil, paper and
13Voicemail will be credit 50:50 on-net and off-net
14This are the instructions group A and C received. The instructions for group B and D only differ
in the basic amount of 24000 talers instead of 19000 talers.
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a calculator. A calculator tool can be found at the bottom left of your screen as soon
as the experiment starts.
During the experiment you can earn talers depending on your decisions. At the end
of the experiment, the gained talers are exchanged at a rate of 1000 talers = 1 Euro
and paid out to you. To do so, please wait in your booth until you are called to collect
your payment. Please bring all your documents, which you got from us, to the payout
after the experiment. You start with a basic amount of 19000 talers (19 Euro). This
amount is downsized by your expenses.
The costs of the chosen tariff are drawn off your starting amount after each decision.
Please note: Exactly one tariff must be chosen under any circumstance. In case no
tariff has been chosen, the worst tariff is selected for you. You are able to minimize
your expenses by your own decision.
Additionally to the experiment, you can earn further 1000 talers by estimating
correctly your personal consumption within a range of ±20%.
Please note that from now on and during the entire experiment, you must not talk
to any other participant. We are forced to call off the experiment, should it happen.
Please switch off your mobile phones and turn it back on not until the experiment has
ended. If there are any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you.
Instruction15
Welcome to this decision experiment regarding mobile phone tariffs
Please indicate your average mobile phone usage in terms of outgoing minutes per
month: My consumption is about outgoing minutes per month.
Round 1
An analysis of your telephony characteristics has shown, that you call with your mobile
phone 25 minutes a month. The following tariffs apply to the identical mobile phone
of company X. Decisions 1 - 5 are independent of each other. Please choose exactly
one tariff.
Decision 1: As your former mobile phone contract has run out of contract, you
have the chance to choose between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 1 taler.
15This is the instruction group A received. The instructions for group B, C and D display the
corresponding averages of monthly outgoing minutes.
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T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.07 talers.
Decision 2: As your former mobile phone contract has run out of contract, you have
the chance to chose between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 50 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.18 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 50 talers, monthly subscription fee = 7 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 50 talers, monthly subscription fee = 12 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.1 talers.
Decision 3: As your former mobile phone contract has run out of contract, you have
the chance to chose between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.6 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 120 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 15 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
Decision 4: As your former mobile phone contract has run out of contract, you have
the chance to chose between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 50 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.5 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 77 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.275 talers.
T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 648 talers, monthly subscription fee = 50 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.275 talers.
Decision 5: As your former mobile phone contract has run out of contract, you have
the chance to chose between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 30 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.5 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 20,25 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
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T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 240 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
Round 2
Two years later your existing contract runs out and you have to choose a new tariff. In
your booth, you find a copy of a representative invoice. Determine your consumption
and take it as fixed over the next 24 months. The following tariffs apply to the identical
mobile phone of company X. Decisions 6 - 10 are independent of each other. Please
choose exactly one tariff.
Your mobile phone invoice:
• Invoice date 10/2010
• Billing Increment 60/60
• Mobile phone number: 017xxxxxxxxx
• Total (All numbers in EUR zero - rate VAT) x, xx
Date Time Number Duration
01.10.2010 13:51:40 01604477xxx 00:21:34
04.10.2010 16:32:10 01604477xxx 00:07:49
05.10.2010 18:21:45 01743152xxx 00:04:19
08.10.2010 11:29:10 01743152xxx 00:08:09
09.10.2010 14:58:30 01604477xxx 00:05:48
10.10.2010 11:27:04 01743152xxx 00:03:42
11.10.2010 13:24:00 01693152xxx 00:06:27
13.10.2010 14:57:25 01743152xxx 00:11:20
13.10.2010 14:59:51 01523152xxx 00:02:19
21.10.2010 11:36:13 01743152xxx 00:20:22
27.10.2010 15:41:23 01604477xxx 00:06:16
28.10.2010 22:32:48 01743152xxx 00:02:16
29.10.2010 22:33:57 01743152xxx 00:12:02
Decision 6: With your newly gained insight you now have the chance to choose
between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 1 talers.
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T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.7 talers.
Decision 7: With your newly gained insight you now have the chance to choose
between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 50 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.2 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 50 talers, monthly subscription fee = 5 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.225 talers.
T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 50 talers, monthly subscription fee = 12 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.19 talers.
Decision 8: With your newly gained insight you now have the chance to choose
between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 12 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.325 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 120 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 15 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
Decision 9: With your newly gained insight you now have the chance to choose
between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 50 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0,5 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 77 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0,275 talers.
T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 648 talers, monthly subscription fee = 50 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0,275 talers.
Decision 10: With your newly gained insight you now have the chance to choose
between the following mobile phone tariffs.
T1: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 30 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.5 talers.
T2: Price for the mobile phone: = 0 talers, monthly subscription fee = 20,25 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
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T3: Price for the mobile phone: = 240 talers, monthly subscription fee = 10 talers,
price per minute for outgoing calls = 0.3 talers.
Round 3 - Concluding Questions




















• Change of provider within the last two years:
– Yes
– No
If you felt that two or more tariffs in this experiment were equally good, which criteria
did you employ to decide for one tariff?
I chose the tariff, which
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• was in the first place.
• had the lowest device price.
• had the lowest basic charge per month.
• lowest price per minute.
• I never perceived two or more tariffs as equally good.
Thank you for participating in this experiment!
Table 7: Summary Statistics
Variable Description
age Age of participant
semester Semester of participant
time Time needed to take a single decision
female Dummy = 1 if a participant is female
prepaid Dummy = 1 if a participant is a prepaid customer
econ Dummy = 1 if a participant studies economics or business
mobinthigh Dummy = 1 if a participant uses mobile Internet sometimes or regularly
enet Dummy = 1 if a participant is a E-net customer
satisfiedhigh Dummy = 1 if a participant is satisfied or very satisfied with its provider
switched Dummy = 1 if a participant has switched its provider within the last 2 years
groupAC Dummy = 1 if a participant is in group A or C
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Table 8: Choice 5* - for all possible combinations
Variable choice525200 choice5120200 choice52570 choice570120
Probit
Dep. Var. Buy now option
age -0.0239*** -0.0242*** -0.0188*** -0.0190***
(0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0067)
time 0.0039*** 0.0043*** 0.0025* 0.0031*
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017)
female -0.1311 -0.1173 -0.1746* -0.1488
(0.0964) (0.1040) (0.1008) (0.1054)
prepaid -0.0747 0.0993 0.0291 0.1862**
(0.1044) (0.0956) (0.1081) (0.0956)
econ 0.0570 -0.0100 -0.0031 -0.0622
(0.1134) (0.1443) (0.1316) (0.1496)
mobinthigh -0.0357 0.0307 0.0900 0.1615
(0.1147) (0.1223) (0.1103) (0.1075)
enet -0.2377*** -0.1953** -0.1330 -0.0923
(0.0900) (0.0999) (0.1150) (0.1193)
satisfiedhigh 0.3498** 0.3172* 0.1413 0.1239
(0.1594) (0.1836) (0.1607) (0.1704)
switched 0.0350 -0.2018 0.0419 -0.1855*
(0.0969) (0.1104) (0.0989) (0.1081)
groupAC 0.0054 0.0362 -0.0036 0.0342
(0.1022) (0.1005) (0.1066) (0.1020)
N 85 85 85 85
Pseudo R2 0.2840 0.2853 0.1540 0.1849
∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistically significant on the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level
Results are already transformed to marginal effects
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 9: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
for all choices and given usages
Choice 1 - 25 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0000 1.000
120 -0.0024 1.000
Combined K-S 0.0024 1.000 1.000
Choice 2 - 25 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0405 0.967
120 -0.0714 0.901
Combined K-S 0.0714 1.000 1.000
Choice 3 - 25 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0238 0.988
120 -0.0071 0.999
Combined K-S 0.0238 1.000 1.000
Choice 4 - 25 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0500 0.950
120 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.0500 1.000 1.000
Choice 5 - 25 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.2786 0.204
120 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.2786 0.404 0.306
Choice 1 - 70 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.0000 1.000
200 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.0000 1.000 1.000
Choice 2 - 70 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.0000 1.000
200 -0.0909 0.827
Combined K-S 0.0909 1.000 1.000
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Choice 3 - 70 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.1174 0.729
200 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.1174 0.997 0.987
Choice 4 - 70 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.0341 0.974
200 -0.0114 0.997
Combined K-S 0.0341 1.000 1.000
Choice 5- 70 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.1098 0.758
200 -0.0417 0.961
Combined K-S 0.1098 0.999 0.994
Choice 1 - 120 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0000 1.000
120 -0.0524 0.945
Combined K-S 0.0524 1.000 1.000
Choice 2 - 120 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0500 0.950
120 -0.1000 0.815
Combined K-S 0.1000 1.000 1.000
Choice 3 - 120 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.2048 0.424
120 0.0000 1
Combined K-S 0.2048 0.784 0.698
Choice 4 - 120 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.2667 0.233
120 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.2667 0.460 0.380
Choice 5 - 120 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
25 0.0333 0.977
120 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.0333 1.000 1.000
28
Choice 1 - 200 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.0000 1.000
200 -0.0417 0.961
Combined K-S 0.0417 1.000 1.000
Choice 2 - 200 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.1326 0.668
200 -0.1212 0.714
Combined K-S 0.1326 0.988 0.960
Choice 3 - 200 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.1970 0.410
200 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.1970 0.765 0.673
Choice 4 - 200 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.0076 0.999
200 -0.2045 0.383
Combined K-S 0.2045 0.723 0.598
Choice 5 - 200 Minutes Usage
Smaller group D P-value Exact
70 0.0227 0.988
200 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S 0.0227 1.000 1.000
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